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This paper analyzes the optimal choice of the length of time over which the monetary
authority targets money growth, in a setting where the monetary authority’s lack of credi-
bility potentially gives rise to an inflationary bias. When the monetary authority has some
private information—e.g. aprivate forecast—that obscures the relevance of reputational con-
siderations and the effectiveness of legislation to enforce the efficient policy, the targeting
procedure serves as a device to diminish the inflationary bias while providing the monetary
authority limited flexibility to react to its private information. The analysis strengthens
the monetarist proposition that the monetary authority should follow a strict rule. Even
when the monetary authority has a fairly accurate forecasting technology, the optimal tar-
geting period can be very short, implying that limited or no flexibility in monetary policy
would be optimal.1 Introduction
How much flexibility or discretion should be given to the monetary authority? The
answer to this time-honored question, in the monetarist spirit, is essentially none.
Under the presumption that the monetary authority lacks an ability to forecast
accurately or is able to forecast, at best, as well as economic agents, discretionary
policy only creates an additional element of uncertainty that unnecessarily compli-
cates economic agents’ decision problems. Hence, the monetary authority should
follow a strict rule, e.g., a constant growth rate rule.’ Against the monetarist pre-
scription, proponents for an activist rule for the monetary authority argue that the
inflexibility of a strict rule precludes an optimal response to unanticipated distur-
bances.
To this already complicated question, recent developments in the literature have
added more complexity, highlighting strategic considerations in the monetary con-
trol problem. When the market determined output and/or employment level is sub-
optimal due to some distortions existing in the economy such as income taxation,
trade unions, and/or unemployment insurance, a benevolent monetary authority
will try to raise employment or output by surprising agents with high inflation if
temporary nominal rigidities are present. Rational, forward-looking agents, recog-
nizing this incentive, set high rates of wage inflation to discourage the monetary
authority from trying to reduce their real wage below their target level. Hence,
even if the monetary authority is perfectly benevolent in that it maximizes social
welfare, its policy might be inefficient; the equilibrium could be characterized by
excessively high average inflation—an inflationary bias. As recognized since Kyd-
land and Prescott’s (1977) seminal paper, the efficient policy that avoids this bias
might not be dynamically consistent.
Generally, when there is complete information, in the sense that individuals know
1the monetary authority’s preferences and observe the realizations of the stochas-
tic variables that constrain its choices, the reputational mechanism can serve to
eliminate or, at least, partially diminish the extent of suboptimality arising from
the dynamic inconsistency problem.2 If, however, the monetary authority has some
private information, the efficacy of the reputational mechanism is called into ques-
tion. Specifically, as shown by Canzoneri (1985), when the information structure
is incomplete so that individuals cannot verify that the monetary authority has
not intentionally invalidated their expectations, reputational considerations might
not be operational. Moreover, private information precludes the effectiveness of
any commitment technology to force the monetary authority to adhere to the op-
timal rule unless there is a separate mechanism to force the monetary authority to
truthfully reveal its private information.3
Given these problems associated with policymaker’s private information, Can-
zoneri (1985) suggests a legislative approach as a possible solution.4 The presumed
commitment technology for this approach is partial in that it cannot force the
monetary authority to truthfully reveal its private information. Nevertheless, this
approach is particularly attractive since the legislated procedure can be specified in
terms of variables—e.g., the growth rates of monetary aggregates—that are observed
by all market participants. One example, studied by Canzoneri, is a two-period
targeting procedure requiring that the average money growth rate per two peri-
ods equal the socially desired rate. More generally, provided that the procedure
does not depend on the monetary authority’s private information and the monetary
authority can control perfectly the targeted variable, the procedure is operational.
This paper extends Canzoneri’s analysis of a two-period targeting procedure to
a multi-period setting to investigate the scope of flexibility, in terms of the number
of targeting periods, that should be given to the monetary authority. For example,
Congress could pass legislation mandating the monetary authority to announce a
2targeting period, during which time the growth ofthe money stock must average the
rate corresponding to the (given) socially optimal inflation rate. Such an extension
permits the analysis to identify the key factors that influence the optimal choice
of the time interval over which the monetary authority, facing a trade-off between
output stability and inflation stability, must hit its target for money growth.
Under this procedure, the longer is the the targeting period, the greater is the
degree of flexibility permitted in policy and the greater is the equilibrium infla-
tionary bias in each period. The optimal targeting period embodies the optimal
trade-off between the cost of the remaining inflationary bias and the loss of flexi-
bility to accommodate the predictable component of money demand shocks - i.e.
the monetary authority’s private information - relative to the policy that is fully
discretionary.
As the monetary authority’s preference for inflation stability increases relative
to its preference for output stability, the optimal targeting period becomes longer.
The basic intuition for this result is that the monetary authority’s incentive to cre-
ate surprises decreases, thereby decreasing each period’s equilibrium inflationary
bias and, hence, increasing the degree of flexibility afforded by the N-period tar-
geting procedure to react to its private information. As the monetary authority’s
preference for inflation stability becomes very large, however, the constraint im-
posed by the targeting procedure is no longer desirable (or necessary) because the
inflationary bias that emerges in the full-discretionary solution becomes infinitesi-
mal. In this case, the optimal target period is infinite. In the other extreme case
where the optimal target period is one, the targeting procedure simplifies to a con-
stant money growth rule. Such a rule eliminates the inflationary bias, but at the
cost of sacrificing flexibility that would otherwise permit the monetary authority to
react to its private information about money demand shocks. The constant money
growth rule is more likely to emerge as the optimal targeting policy as the weight
3that the monetary authority attaches to inflation stability approaches zero, given
the relative size of the monetary authority’s private information to its incentives.
In what follows, the next section briefly presents the model of monetary pol-
icy with private information in a multi-period setting and analyzes the monetary
authority’s optimal, time-consistent monetary policy subject to the N-period aver-
age targeting constraint. Section 3 presents simulations of the model to illustrate
how the parameters of the model,—particularly, the monetary authority’s preference
for inflation stabilization relative to that for output stabilization and the value of
the private information (i.e., the variance of the predictable part of the distur-
bance to money demand that should be accommodated to stabilize inflation and
output)—influence the optimal choice of the target period. The main finding of
this exercise is that, given that a finite period targeting procedure dominates the
full-discretionary policy, optimality implies extremely limited, ifany, flexibility per-
mitted in monetary policy. This finding is surprising in that it is not driven by any
skepticism about the accuracy of the monetary authority’s private forecast. As
such, this paper provides further support to the importance of taking into account
the credibility problem in addition to the monetary authority’s forecasting ability
when optimally designing feasible monetary rules. Finally, section 4 offers some
concluding remarks, including possible extensions of the analysis.
2 A Model of Monetary Policy with Multi-Period Targeting
This section presents a simple economic model to investigate the efficacy of multi-
period average targeting procedure to approach a better outcome thanthat achieved
with full discretion when the monetary authority has private information. Follow-
ing conventional practice, the analysis builds on a standard rational-expectations
4supply function,
yt=y~+0(irt—ir) 0>0, (1)
where lrt denotes the inflation rate, yfl, the natural level of output, andir, the wage
setters’ expectation of inflation conditional on information available at the end of
period t-1.
The following quantity equation determines the equilibrium price level:
m~—p~=y~—v~, (2)
where mt and Pt equaW the logs of the money supply and the price level and Vt 1S
the log ofthe velocity of money, assumed to follow arandom walk. The equilibrium
inflation rate is obtained by taking the first-difference of (2),
(3)
whereö~ = Vt_i—Vt and g,~equals the growth rate ofmoney, the monetary authority’s
instrument.5 5~is an i.i.d. random variable with a zero mean and a finite variance,
a~.When wages are set, t5~is not known, i.e., 5 = 0. The expression in (3), then,
implies that wage setters’ expectation of inflation depends solely on the monetary
authority’s policy, g~. This expectation, g~,ultimately depends on the monetary
authority’s strategy.
To study alternative strategies for the monetary authority, the analysis to follow
assumes that the monetary authority chooses its policy to maximize its expected
N-period average utility:
U=Eo{y~>ut} (4)
where, one-period utility in period ti sgiven by
n2 *2
ut=—Qjt—ky) —s(lrt—lr), k>1,
5E~{.} is an expectations operator conditional on t = r information, and oo > N 1
denotes the length of the targeting period. For N = oo, the expected average utility
is given by Et(ut).6 ky’s represents the log of the socially desirable output level.7
7t*
is the socially optimal inflation rate, and s is the weight the monetary authority
attaches to its goal of inflation stability relative to its goal of output stability.
Recalling that 6 = 0 and using (1) and (3), the monetary authority’s one-period
utility can be expressed as,
(5)
where, for notational simplicity, f = and y~ = (k — i)ç.
After period t wages are set, the monetary authority chooses its policy, gj. In
contrast to wage setters, the monetary authority receives some information about
the disturbance to the money demand equation (S~)after wages are set but before
policy actions are taken. Specifically, it has a private forecast of this disturbance,
d~ = E~{S~} that satisfies
(6)
where Ct is an i.i.d. disturbance realized after policy is implemented. This forecast
error has a zero mean, a finite variance, crE~,and no correlation with d~.Similarly,
d~is i.i.d. with a zero mean and a finite variance, o~.Section 3 discusses the case
when d~is serially correlated. Although wage setters observe St and 7rt after g~ is
set, they cannot distinguish the monetary authority’s forecast, d~, from the forecast
error ~t•
8
Before deriving the optimal, time-consistent monetary policy with multi-period
targeting, two benchmark solutions are presented for the purpose of comparison.
The first solution, the efficient solution, is that which would obtain if there were
some commitment technology that would permit the monetary authority to adhere
to a contingent rule, while truthfully revealing its private information. The second
6solution, the full discretionary solution, assumes that the monetary authority takes
wage setters’ expectations as given. It is identical to the casewhereN = oc, since an
infinite-period targeting procedure is equivalent to no constraint on the monetary
policy. As indicated below, even when N = oc, reputational considerations are not
relevant given the existence of the monetary authority’s private information.
2.1 The Efficient Solution
Assuming a full commitment technology to force the monetary authority to truth-
fully reveal its private information and to adhere to a contingent rule so that it
could essentially influence wage setters’ expectations in a way that is consistent
with its policy, the optimal monetary policy, denoted by ~, is given by
~t=7r*+dt, (7)
fort = 1,2,~ . . , which yields the followingexpected average utility forthe monetary
authority,
U=_(1+f)o~_y*2. (8)
Note that the money growth rule in (7) completely accommodates money de-
mand shocks to stabilize inflation, but it does not attempt to create surprise infla-
tion in a fruitless effort to increase output above the natural level.
2.2 The Full-Discretionary Solutions
Under an alternative assumption that the monetary authority does not consider
the impact it can have on wage setters’ expectations, it maximizes the expectation
of (5) conditional on its forecast of the disturbance to money demand, subject to
(6), taking g as given. The wage setters’ expectation of the associated first order
7condition implies g~= 1r*+~.Bysubstituting g back into the first order condition,
one can verify that the money growth rate under this regime, denoted by ~, is given
by
g~t=7r*+dt+~j~. (9)
Note that the monetary authority’s private information is fully revealed in the
outcome. Although the monetary authority can do no better than to set its poi-
icy according to (9), given wage-setters’ expectations, the monetary authority’s
incentive to create surprise inflation generates an inflationary bias, ~ Even if the
monetary authority had no private information, this bias would emerge provided
that it took expectations as given.
The inefficiency of this solution is revealed by comparing the expected average
utility of the monetary authority, in this regime, given by
(10)
to that obtained in the efficient regime, given by (8)~.The difference between (8)
and (10), ~, captures the disutility of the inflationary bias.
2.3 The N-Period Targeting Solution
As is widely recognized, while the full-discretionary policy is not first-best, the effi-
cient solution is not necessarily a feasible outcome in the absence of a commitment
technology. That is, the monetary policy (7) is not incentive compatible in the sense
that, once wages are set, the monetary authority’s optimal policy no longer corre-
sponds to (7). Rather, the monetary authority would like to set g~ = ~+ d~ +
In addition, the monetary authority’s private information obscures the role of rep-
utational considerations to diminish the inflationary bias. Without a complete
information structure, wage setters cannot verify that the monetary authority has
8followed the efficient policy, ~. Moreover, the monetary authority’s private infor-
mation precludes the effectiveness of legislation to require the monetary authority
to implement policy according to (7). Even if the legislation were binding, the
monetary authority would have an incentive to lie, claiming that its forecast of
St equaled d~+ to disguise the optimal cheating policy, given g7 = f, as the
efficient policy.
As a possible resolution to the inefficiency of the inflationary bias when the
monetary authority cannot credibly reveal its private information, Canzoneri (1985)
studies a 2-period average targeting procedure, requiring g, + g~= 27r*. This
procedure is attractive not only in its simplicity but in that its independence of the
monetary authority’s private forecast makes it operational. As a generalization of
his analysis, consider an extended average targeting procedure that requires
N
>1gt = lr*N, (11)
where 0 < N < oo and ~ denotes the money growth policy under the N period
targeting procedure. For N = oc, there is no effective constraint on the conduct of
policy.
To derive the optimal, dynamically consistent monetary policy under this average
targeting regime, a backward solution concept is appropriate. Specifically, the
monetary authority maximizes the sum of the expected value of (5) in t = N and
t = N-i with respect to gN—1 subject to the forecast dN_i and (ii), taking g~and
as given. Repeating this exercise for t = N-2, N-3, ~ one can find that
-e (N—t)(1+f) d 9t=9t+Nt+(Nt+i)f (12)
where
— N7r* (N — t)y* ~ _________
9fort=1,.~~,N.
To eliminate past ~s oas to express the optimal policy only in terms of current
and past d as well as the parameters of the model, (12) is used to find ~, and




,. .~ — Nir~ (N — t)y* (N — t)(1 + ~ d
for t = 1,. . . ,N. By rearranging (13) and simplifying, one can derive the optimal
monetary policy subject to the N-period targeting constraint:
- — * (N — t)y* (N — t)(i + ~ d g~—~+(Nt+1)f+Nt+(Nt+1)f
t_1 *
d1 14 ~t(N—r+1)f N—r+(N—r+1)f rj,
fort=i,••,N.
Expected average utility under this regime is given by
*2 N N 1
U= *2 (1+f)u2 Nf~~N—t+1 ~~N—r+1~2
f2(1+f) 2’~’ 1 2 15
- N ad~[N(N)fI
1 2 Nt—i 1
- N
Note that the sum of the first two terms inthe above expression equals the expected
average utility under the efficient solution. Hence, the last three terms reflect the
inefficiency of the average targeting procedure.
10Assuming the optimal targeting period N* is finite’0, it maximizes (15). For
N < N*, the average inefficiency is decreasing, while, for N > N*, the average
inefficiency is increasing as shown with an example in Figure 1. The horizontal line
in the figure measures the normalized, average inefficiency of the full-discretionary
solution when f = 1.0 and = 1.35, i.e., 11~1= 1.82. The inverted V-shaped
curve measures the normalized, average inefficiency of a multi-period targeting
over various N, showing that N* = 6 for the chosen parameter values.
The monetary policy in (14) is dynamically consistent, like the full-discretionary
solution. Note, however, that for finite N the inflationary bias is lower than that
in the full-discretionary solution. From (13) or (14) in t = 1, for example, one
can verify that the bias is ~ which is reversed in each of the subsequent
N-i periods, by increments of ~j; similarly, the bias in t = 2i s which is
reversed in the subsequent N-2 periods, in increments of It should be noted
that the increments would not be of the same magnitude if there were discounting.
In the case of no discounting, the net effect of the remaining inflationary bias on
the monetary authority’s utility is captured by the third term in (15). Because
any period’s inflationary bias, that must eventually be reversed over the remainder
of the targeting period, increases as N increases, the loss in utility due to the
remaining inflationary bias increases as N becomes large. Observe that this loss
converges to as N goes to infinity.
In contrast to the full-discretionary and the efficient solutions, the monetary
policy in (14) involves only a partial accommodation of the current shock. The
targeting procedure limits the monetary authority’s flexibility to react to its infor-
mation so as to stabilize inflation and output. But, as N approaches infinity, the
accommodation is full. The effect of increasing the monetary authority’s flexibility
to react to its private information is partly captured by the fourth term in (15)
which is decreasing in N. That is, by relaxing the monetary authority’s constraint,
iiincreasing the length ofthetargeting period provides more leewayto achieveoutput
and inflation stabilization goals.
The constraint (ii), however, requires that the accommodation in every period
be reversed in subsequent periods. The effect of this requirement can be observed
easily in (13) or (14). In particular, as the constraint becomes more binding,—
i.e., t approaches N—the monetary authority’s reaction to the current shock ap-
proaches zero. The reaction to the shock in time t, d~,is reversed in increments
of Nt+(Nt+i) d~in each of the remaining N-t periods. Again, that the increments
of the reversal of a given reaction to a time t shock are of equal magnitude is due
to the assumption that the monetary authority has a zero discount rate. The fifth
term in (is) reflects the cost of having to reverse earlier reactions to shocks. As N
increases, that loss in utility increases. Combining the fourth and fifth terms of (15)
yields the net effect of the flexibility permitted by the targeting procedure. As N
becomes large enough, the value of flexibility permitted by the targeting procedure
falls.
That the sum of the last three terms in (15) is increasing in magnitude in N
for N> N* implies that the targeting procedure becomes more inefficient as N in-
creases above the optimal targeting period. Nevertheless, the targeting procedure
will dominate the full-discretionary solution (N = oo) provided that the magnitude
of the sum of those terms is less than ~, the disutility of the inflationary bias
that would emerge in the full-discretionary equilibrium. Moreover, a multi-period
targeting procedure will dominate a constant growth rule provided that the mag-
nitude of the sum of those terms is less than (1 + f)cr~. Note that a sufficient
condition for N* to be finite is that (1 +f)o~< ~—i.e., a strict rule dominates the
full-discretionary solution. Indeed, as shown in the next section, given that ]\T’~is
finite, it is most likely to be equal to one.
123 Optimal Targeting Periods: Simulations of the Model
The optimal degree of flexibility afforded by targeting procedure in terms of the
length of the targeting period should depend on the monetary authority’s ability
to forecast (money demand disturbances that are not reflected in existing wage
contracts) ~ and the importance ofstabilization relative to the disutility arising from
the credibility problem (inflationary bias). As in much of this literature, however,
analytically deriving the optimal targeting period, the N*, that maximizes expected
average utility, (15), is not possible despite the simplicity of the model. This section
summarizes the results of simulations that specify the two key parameters of the
model, ~ and f—respectively, the weighted difference between the players’ output
goal relative to the magnitude of the predictable part of the shock and the ratio of
the weight attached to inflation stability relative to output stability in the monetary
authority’s preferences, s, to the elasticity of output with respect to unanticipated
inflation, 0. For various parameter values, N* is reported in Table 1. Discrete
jumps in N*, as the parameter values vary, are due to the fact that changes in the
parameter values are not sufficiently small.
A close inspection of the table reveals two important implications of the simu-
lation exercise. First, for a given ~, as f increases, the optimal targeting period
gets larger. That is, as the monetary authority’s concern for inflation stability gets
larger relative to its concern for output stability or the elasticity of output with
respect to unanticipated inflation becomes smaller, the optimal targeting length in-
creases. The basic idea behind this implication is rather intuitive: as f increases the
monetary authority’s incentive to push output beyond its natural level falls so that
the inflationary bias that would emerge in the full-discretionary equilibrium falls.
Accordingly, the scope of flexibility under the targeting procedure increases. For
large values of f, the optimal targeting solution boils down to the full-discretionary
13solution, in which there is complete flexibility. In this case, the inflationary bias
that emerges under full discretion disappears so that the limits imposed by the
targeting procedure are not necessary.
This implication is similar to that of Rogoff’s (1985) analysis of the perverse
policymaker though Rogoff distinguishes the policymaker’s preference from that
of the society and thereby gives institutional interpretation to the policymaker’s
preference, while the present analysis does not.’2 Nevertheless, as in Rogoff’s, the
inflationary bias that emerges in the full-discretionary outcome becomes less severe
and social welfare is enhanced, as the monetary authority’s dislike for inflation
increases for given a social preference. The crucial distinction between the present
analysis and that of Rogoff lies in the interpretation of flexibility. While Rogoff
(1985) roughly interprets increasing the policymaker’s relative preference for price
stability as limiting flexibility in a one-period setting, the present multi-period
analysis interprets increases in flexibility in terms of increasing N, finding that the
more perverse the policymaker, - i.e., the larger f -, the greater are the advantages
of full flexibility in monetary policy.
The second implication of the simulation exercise is that, for a given f, as
increases, the optimal targeting period becomes shorter. There are two forces at
work here. As y’~increases for a given Cd, the difference between the socially optimal
output target and the natural level of output becomes larger; as a consequence, the
inflationary biasthat would emerge in the full-discretionary solution becomes larger,
thereby detracting from the degree offlexibility afforded by the targeting procedure.
Further, as Cd falls for a given y~,the expected value of reacting to current shocks
(the monetary authority’s private information) to stabilize inflation and output
falls. Thus, the strict one-period targeting rule becomes optimal for sufficiently
high values of ~-. This implication further distinguishes our results from that of
Rogoff (1985). Specifically, Rogoff finds that some flexibility in monetary policy is
14almost always better than none (i.e., a constant money growth rule or, in terms of
his analysis, an extremely perverse policymaker). In contrast, the present analysis
finds that a constant growth rule (N*=i) can emerge as the optimal policy for some
values ofthe parameters. This distinction arises both from an explicit consideration
of the policymaker’s forecasting ability - i.e., the variance of the predictable part
of money demand shocks that should be accommodated to stabilize inflation and
output relative to the difference in the output goals - and use of a multi-period
setting in contrast to Rogoff’s one-period setting. Even if there were supply shocks
as in Rogoff’s (1985) model, this distinction would emerge
It is difficult to interpret the simulation results directly in terms of actual data
because the difference in output goals is measured in (log) levels and the scale that
would be appropriate is not clear. Nevertheless, Table 1 suggests that the full-
discretionary solution generally dominates any finite targeting procedure.’3 But,
provided that there is room for improvement by imposing a binding constraint on
monetary policy, the table illustrates that N* = 1. This result is rather interesting,
considering the fact that, in many nations where the central banks have adopted
some form of a monetary targeting procedure, the targeting period coincides with
the wage contract period, typically a year. The result is also illustrated by Figure
2, which depicts regions for N* = 1,2,3,4 and N* 5 in terms of combinations
of f and ~. Even with this limited opportunity set, the figure shows that the
regions for which N* = 1 and N* 5 are the largest areas among those under
consideration. More generally, by sequentially increasing the opportunity set and
deriving explicit regions for N* 5, (e.g., N* = 5, N* = 6, etc.) it is possible to
see that N* become progressively narrower as N* <00 increases. Hence, assuming
N* is finite, the optimal degree of flexibility is likely to be extremely limited, if
not entirely eliminated, and a constant money growth rule generally dominates all
other average targeting procedures with finite N.
15Assessing the empirical content of the simulation results is made more difficult
without knowledge of the value of the parameter f. Remember, however, that
f = j~-, the weight of inflation stability relative to output stability in the monetary
authority’s objective function divided by the square ofoutput elasticity with respect
to unanticipated inflation. This ratio is not likely to be very small if the monetary
authority is concerned about inflation at least as much as about output levels and
the output elasticity with respect to unanticipated inflation is not very high. If this
is indeed the case, the simulation results would indicate that multi-period targeting
procedures more than the one period are not likely to be optimal, implying that
flexibility for the monetary authority should be extremely limited. This result
is surprising, in that, although it appears to be in the monetarist spirit, it does
not depend on any skepticism about the monetary authority’s forecasting ability.
Accordingly, this exercise provides further support to the importance of taking into
account the credibility problem in addition to the monetary authority’s forecasting
ability when optimally designing feasible monetary rules.
One caveat to the above analysis should be noted, however. Specifically, the
assumption that d~is not serially correlated is a strong assumption. Indeed, the
above extreme results might appear to be driven partly by the transitory nature of
the monetary authority’s private information. While the effect of the persistence
of shocks to the growth of velocity on the targeting period is not obvious in the
context of this model, such persistence is likely to increase the monetary authority’s
desire for maintained flexibility.
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper has investigated the efficacy of average monetary targeting to reduce
the inflationary bias that otherwise emerges as a result of the monetary authority’s
16incentive to surprise agents in an effort to increase output beyond its natural level.
Reputational considerations and the imposition of a contingent rule, as reasonable
methods of eliminating the bias while retaining flexibility for output and inflation
stabilization, arecalled into questionwhen the monetary authority has some private
information and there is no mechanism to enforce a truthful dissemination ofthat
information. Provided that the inflationary bias is sufficiently large, an average
monetary targeting procedureto eliminate the bias will be optimal. As the targeting
period gets longer, the amount offlexibility permitted by the procedure increases,
but at a cost ofa higher equilibrium inflationarybias. Hence, the optimaltargeting
period defines the optimal trade-off between the cost of limited flexibility and the
cost of the remaining bias. Generally, if there is room for improvement with the
average targeting procedure, a targeting policy with extremely limited flexibility
seems to be the optimal policy.
As indicated earlier, that the optimal targeting period is very short might appear
to be driven partly by the transitory nature of the monetary authority’s private
information. Thus, an interesting extension of the analysis, left for future research,
involves giving the monetary authority’s private information some persistence and
examining how much such persistence will increase the monetary authority’s desire
for maintained flexibility. Also, given this persistence, the monetary authority
might be able to employ Crawford and Sobel’s (1982) concept of cheap talk to partly
reveal its private information. Specifically, it could announce a target range that
partially reveals the persistent (permanent) component of its private information.
Accordingly, it could keep the equilibrium inflationary bias low while enhancing the
scope flexibility permitted by the targeting procedure. While the target period, N,
would be determined from the stationary part of the model, the level and width of
target range would be determined every N periods on the basis of the persistent
component of the monetary authority’s private information.
17Another possible extension would be to introduce different shocks, such as pro-
ductivity shocks into the model, as Rogoff (1985) does. With a richer model spec-
ification in a multi-period setting, we can consider the relative merits of money,
interest rate, inflation rate and nominal income targeting procedures and their re-
spective implications for the determination of the optimal targeting period length.
18FOOTNOTES
1. See Meltzer (1989) whose skepticism about the Fed’s forecasting ability leads
him to advocate a constant money growth rate rule. Leijonhufvud (1984) provides
a detailed discussion about the uncertainty generated by discretionary policy under
different monetary regimes.
2. See Barro and Gordon (1983) and Rogoff (1987). For a general discussion
about dynamic inconsistency, see Hillier and Malcomson (1984). A necessary, but
not sufficient condition for dynamic inconsistency is that the government has fewer
instruments than objectives.
3. Canzoneri (1985) shows that Rogoff’s (1985) perverse policymaker solution to
the precommitment problem suffers from a similar criticism when the information
structure is asymmetric.
4. For complimentary analyses of monetary policy with private information,
see Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) and Stein (1989). In contrast to these analyses
that mainly focus on maintained secrecy in monetary policy arising from private
information, the present paper tries to specify an operational rule that improves
upon the dead-lock situation arising from the credibility problem.
5. As indicated earlier, for the targeting procedure to work, the analysis must
assume that the monetary authority can perfectly control g~if that is its target.
That the Fed chooses to target M2 (and M3) rather than the monetary base, over
which it has more control, could be related to the secrecy problem. See, for example,
Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) who show that the monetary authority might choose
a less precise procedure for policy implementation so as to maintain some degree
of ambiguity and keep its information private to some extent. The present analysis
does not permit a meaningful distinction between Ml, M2, M3 or the monetary
base.
196. The implicit assumption here that the monetary authority does not discount
the future is not strong. A discount factor less than 1 only complicates the analysis
without providing much additional insight. (A copy of the solution in the case of
discounting is available from the authors upon request.)
7. See Canzoneri (1985, pp. 1058-59) for a detailed discussion of the motivations
for the assumption that k > 1.
8. Given the sequence of actions by wage setters and the monetary authority
relative to the timing of the realization of the monetary authority’s private infor-
mation and the transitory nature of that private information, Stein’s (1989) notion
of cheap talk is not operational in the context of this model. (See Oh and Garfinkel
(1989) for a brief discussion ofwhy the two-dimensionality of the credibility problem
in monetary policy obscures the relevance of the cheap talk mechanism regardless
of the timing of events. To make cheap talk effective in this framework with a slight
variation in the sequence of events, it is necessary to limit flexibility in monetary
policy.) Section 4 discusses the possibility of extending the model to incorporate
the possibility of cheap talk in the multi-period targeting procedure. It should be
noted that the assumption that 5 = 0i snot crucial here. Even if wage setters
had reasonable forecasts of d~,provided that the monetary authority’s forecast is
private, the analysis to follow is relevant.
9. In this static framework, this solution is equivalent to the (one-shot) Nash
solution. As discussed below, however, this solution more generally is interpreted
as an infinite-period, average targeting procedure.
10. Although it is extremely difficult to write down a closed form solution for
N*, it is possible to verify that N* can be infinite for a certain set of parameter
specifications. (See section 3.)
11. In fact, provided that the forecasting technology is not perfect (i.e., et ~ 0),
the assumption about the timing of the realization of private information makes
20the degree of inaccuracy of the monetary authority’s forecasting irrelevant. Rather,
it is the possible magnitude of the predictable part of the shock that is crucial for
the determination of N*. However, one can easily translate this magnitude into the
degree of accuracy by assuming a different timing sequence.
12. Focusing on this distinction between the policymaker’s preference and that
of the society, Lohman (1989) analyzes an interesting problem of what incentive
structure should be imposed on central banks. Ignoring this distinction, Flood and
Isard (i98~)follow an approach similar to that of the present analysis. However,
they study the case when there is a non-stationary shock, finding that the strict
rule with an escape clause achieves a better outcome than the strict rule only. For
a general survey on this and related issues, see Persson and Tabellini (1990).
13. Additional simulations confirm this interpretation of the table. Moreover,
they show that , for f ~ ~, the full-discretionary solution dominates all finite
targeting procedures with N < 1000.
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i-” Strictly speaking, N*=co indicates that the full-discretionary solution dominates only those
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